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Abstract
In many situations there is a potential for conict both within and
between groups. Examples include wars and civil wars and distrib-
utional conict in multitiered organizations like federal states or big
companies. This paper models such situations with a logistic technol-
ogy of conict. If individuals decide simultaneously and independently
about the amount of internal conict, external conict and produc-
tion, there is typically either only internal conict, or only external
conict - but not both. If each group decides collectively how much
each member has to put into the external conict before the members
individually decide on the amounts put into the internal conict and
production, groups choose su¢ ciently high external conict in order
to avoid internal conict. This is a model of the "diversionary use of
force". We also study the optimal number of groups.
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The relation of comradeship and peace in the we-group and that
of hostility and war towards the other-groups are correlative to
each other. The exigencies of war with outsiders are what make
peace inside.(Sumner 1906, p. 12).
1 Introduction
Many political and economic situations have a potential for conict both
within and between groups. Military conicts, wars and civil wars often
involve these two layers of conict.1 Rent-seeking or appropriative activities
in multi-tiered organizations like federal states, rms or universities are other
examples.2
As William Sumner stated almost 100 years ago, there seems to be a
negative correlation between conicts within a group and conict between
groups.3 Ralf Dahrendor¤ even called this a law of the social sciences.4
This group cohesion e¤ect has been the subject of a large literature in the
social sciences. There is support for the group cohesion e¤ect from sociology,
1For example, in the Civil War in Spain the two ghting sides or groupsconsisted of
several sub-groups: the old government, the Anarchists, the Communists and others on
the left; the Falange with two fractions, the Royalists and the Carlists on the right. On
each side, these forces joined to ght against their common enemy; however, there were
also severe ghts within each of the camps. In the May risings in Barcelona 1937, ghting
between Anarchists, Trotskyists, and Communists lead to several hundred deaths. On a
smaller scale in April 1937 gun battles took place in Salamanca among the two wings of
the Falange. See Beevor (2001), Chapter XIX.
2See Wärneryd (1998) on rent-seeking in federal states; Müller and Wärneryd (2001)
on conicts between inside and outside owners of a company; and Inderst, Müller and
Wärneryd (2002) on distributional conict within organizations. See also Konrad (2004).
In addition, Glazer (2002) stresses the importance of internal and external rent-seeking
in organizations. See also Garnkel (1994) for a study of interrelations between domestic
politics and international conict.
3Similar points were observed much earlier by chroniclers of the Italian city republics,
as Waley (1988, p. 117) reports: "Even in the eleventh century Milanese chroniclers had
remarked of their fellow citizens that when they lack external adversaries they turn their
hatred against each other. This well-founded observation was to become a commonplace
for other cities too. Florence was built under the signs of Aries and Mars, says Malispini:
our ancestors were always ghting battles and wars and when they had no other opponent
they fought among themselves".
4"It appears to be a general law that human groups react to external pressure by
increased internal coherence." Dahrendorf (1964), p. 58, cited after Levy (1989), p. 261.
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psychology, and anthropology.5 A recent case in point was noted by The
Economist: George W. Bush had "a year of stratospheric popularity after
the attacks of September 11th 2001 and a shorter gust of support after the
war began in Iraq"6.
This paper is one of the rst studies of an economic model of conict
for such situations with simultaneous conicts at di¤erent levels. Economic
models of conict start with the fact that property rights are not always
completely enforced. Thus individuals can, and do, engage in activities that
are not productive - they do not increase the size of the pie but instead
are aimed at increasing ones share of the pie.7 Each player decides how
to allocate his resources to three kinds of activities: to production, to rent-
seeking (or ghting) for ones own group, and to rent-seeking (or ghting)
within ones own group. We assume that the technology of conict is given by
a logistic or di¤erence form contest success function. The logistic technology
of conict has been used frequently in the literature. Skaperdas (1996) gives
an axiomatic foundation. Hirshleifer (1991) argues that the logistic contest
success function is in line with a number of stylized facts of warfare. We
show that in our model there is an extreme form of the group cohesion
e¤ect: in equilibrium there is conict either between or within groups, but
- except for a nongeneric case - not both at the same time. This result is
due to the property of di¤erence form contest success functions that, in a
symmetric situation where all players choose the same rent-seeking e¤orts,
the marginal returns to rent-seeking are independent of the total amount of
rent-seeking. Thus, if marginal returns to intra-group rent-seeking are higher
than those to inter-group rent-seeking, there is only internal conict, and vice
versa. Changes in the environment can switch the equilibrium from conict
between groups and peace within groups to conict only within groups and
peace between groups, and vice versa.
In the basic model, we assume that all players decide simultaneously and
5For example, Stein concludes in his excellent survey of the literature up to the mid
1970s that, under some conditions, "external conict does increase internal cohesion"
(1976, p. 165). Dion (1979) and Fisher (1990) come to similar conclusions in their surveys
of the literature. See Bornstein (2003) for a survey of related experimental work.
6"On the back foot", June 23rd 2005.
7Such activities have been called appropriation(Grossman 1994), rent-seeking(Tul-
lock 1980), power seeking(Rajan and Zingales 2000), inuence activities(Milgrom 1988,
Milgrom and Roberts 1990), coercive activities(Skaperdas 1992) and simply stealingor
ghting(Hirshleifer 1988, and his essays collected in Hirshleifer 2001) in the literature.
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independently how to allocate their resources to the three kinds of activ-
ity. This is a realistic description in situations with somewhat amorphous
conicts, like rent-seeking in organizations, or chaotic situations within civil
wars. However, in many applications, the decision about external conicts
has a di¤erent character than that over internal conicts. For example, deci-
sions about inter-state wars are usually taken by some political process, e.g.
by a leader, or by an elected government or parliament and not by the sub-
jects individually. We model this in an extension to the basic model where we
assume that each group rst decides how many resources each group member
has to put in the external conict before the individuals decide about the
allocation of their remaining resources to internal ghting and production.
The outcome is quite di¤erent: groups commit to levels of external conict
that are su¢ ciently high to prevent any internal conict occurring.
Thus, we propose a model for the old idea that external conict is used
to prevent internal conict. This "diversionary theory of war" dates back to
Jean Bodin (1556) ("the best way of preserving a state, and guaranteeing
it against sedition, rebellion, and civil war is to keep the subjects in amity
one with another, and to this end, to nd an enemy against whom they can
make common cause" (Six Books of the Commonwealth, translated by M.
J. Tooley 1955, Book V Chap. V)). Jonathan Swift (1720) ("Wise princes
nd it necessary to have wars abroad to keep peace at home"8) and William
Shakespeare (1591) ("Be it thy course to busy giddy minds / With foreign
quarrels", Henry IV Part II, Act 4 Scene 5) expressed similar ideas. The idea
can be found in many historical writings and in case studies of specic wars
(see e.g. Joll (1999) on Germany and others in World War I , and Levy and
Vakili (1992) on Argentina in the Falklands/Malvinas War)9.
Two important contributions are those of Hess and Orphanides (1995,
2001) who explain the occurrence of diversionary wars by the votersincom-
plete information about the abilities of a leader.10 A leader with a reelection
8The quote is from The History of Martin, A digression on the nature usefulness &
necessity of wars and quarels. See Swift (1720 [1958]), p. 305. There are some doubts
whether Swift is indeed the author.
9A list of classic cases is given by Levy and Vakili (1992), Footnote 5 on p. 138. In
the quantitative empirical work on the issue, however, ndings are mixed and no con-
sensus has emerged. See Levy (1989) and Levy (1998) for surveys; recent contributions
include Chiozza and Goemans (2003), Mc Laughlin Mitchell and Prins (2004), and Ford-
ham (2005).
10See also Smith (1996).
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motive and a bad internal performance (say, high unemployment or ination)
may wish to engage in external war in order to convince the voters of his high
military abilities. Contrary to Hess and Orphanides, we assume complete in-
formation and show that there is nevertheless a possibility of diversionary
wars.
Our model also contributes to the explanation of the emergence of several
internal wars after the demise of the cold war. The end of the superpower
confrontation diminished incentives to engage in external conict, because
of less pronounced ideological di¤erences between the two blocks and better
collaboration in international organizations. It also lowered the ability of the
former Eastern Block members to commit themselves to a level of external
conict su¢ cient to eliminate internal conicts. As one would expect from
our model, internal conicts ared up; the wars in the Balkans, in Chechnya,
Georgia, and Moldova are cases in point.
We also derive normative implications for the optimal design of an organi-
zation that is ridden by potential conict both between and within its groups.
For a given size of the organization, how many groups should there be? With
only one group, there is obviously only intra-group conict. Increasing the
number of groups decreases the amount of conict, until at some point con-
ict within groups ceases and conicts between the groups start. After that
point, a further increase in the number of groups leads to more conict and
to less production in equilibrium. We show that, if the technology of conict
is as decisive in the inter-group conict as it is in the intra-group conict,
then the organization should have as many groups as there are individuals
in each group. If the inter-group conict is more decisive, the optimal num-
ber of groups is smaller; and vice versa: if the intra-group conict is more
decisive, there should be more groups.
The paper adds to the literature on the trade-o¤ between production
and appropriation. Important contributions are Skaperdas (1992), Gross-
man (1991, 1994), Grossman and Kim (1995) and Hirshleifer (1988, 2001);
an important recent contribution is Baker (2003). See Hirshleifer (1995) and
Skaperdas (2003) for surveys. In a companion paper, one of us has stud-
ied simultaneous inter- and intra-group conict with a ratio form conict
technology (Münster 2005). However, Münster (2005) does not look at the
case where groups commit to external conict before individuals decide on
production and internal conict, and hence does not study the diversionary
use of force. Moreover, with the ratio form technology, equilibria are always
characterized by simultaneous conicts both between and within groups. In
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addition, the normative implications di¤er. Most importantly, with the ratio
type of technology and equally decisive contests between and within groups,
the number of groups has no inuence on total conict and production. This
is in stark contrast to the ndings for the logistic or di¤erence form contest
technology discussed in this paper.
Our paper is also related to the literature on collective rent-seeking. Early
contributions (Nitzan 1991) assumed that the distribution within a group is
given by some sharing rule which might depend on the inter-group rent-
seeking e¤orts, but did not model the internal conict explicitly. Katz and
Tokatlidu (1996) study a two stage rent-seeking game where in the rst stage,
individuals decide how much to invest in inter-group rent-seeking, and in
the second stage there is internal rent-seeking. Wärneryd (1998) applies a
similar model to rent-seeking in federal states, arguing that a federal state
may actually lead to less rent-seeking than a centralized state, although it
adds one additional layer of conict. Müller and Wärneryd (2001) have a
related result on inside versus outside ownership; and Inderst, Müller, and
Wärneryd (2002) apply this logic to the allocation of scarce resources within a
rm. Konrad and Leininger (2005) present a model where a group can resolve
its collective action problem in the supply of inter-group rent-seeking e¤ort
because the ensuing intra-group rent-seeking contest has multiple equilibria.
In contrast to our paper, none of these papers studies simultaneous inter-
and intra-group conicts, or the case where groups collectively decide about
how much every member must put into the inter-group conict. In addition,
in these rent-seeking models, the size of the contested rent is usually assumed
to be exogenous, whereas our model is concerned with the trade-o¤ between
production and rent-seeking.
Several papers study the e¤ects of di¤erent degrees of external conict.
Alesina and Spolaore (2003, 2005) study the relation between the size of
countries and the incidence of international war. They argue that the equi-
librium size of a country depends on the importance of international war.
Better dened international property rights may lead to smaller countries
and hence a higher number of countries. This has the e¤ect that the number
of international conicts may actually increase. Alesina and Spolaore (2005)
focus on international wars and abstract from internal conicts once a coun-
try is formed. Our analysis complements theirs, since we focus explicitly on
the occurrence of internal as well as international conicts. On the other
hand, we abstract from issues of country formation of secession which are at
the center of their analysis. Garnkel (2004) looks at how an increased ex-
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ternal risk inuences into internal conict. However, she does not explicitly
model the behavior of the competing groups in an external conict.
Section 2 presents the basic model of simultaneous inter- and intra-group
conicts, section 3 studies its equilibria. Section 4 deals with the case where
the individuals collectively decide about the amount of inter-group conict
before engaging in production and internal conict. Here we expose the di-
versionary use of force argument in our model. Section 5 deals with the
normative issues of the optimal number and size of groups. Section 6 con-
cludes. The appendix collects some of the longer proofs.
2 The model
There are n identical individuals who are divided into G groups of equal size
m = n=G. Each individual is endowed with one unit of time. In the basic
model, an individual i in group g has three choice variables: productive e¤ort
eig, intra-group rent-seeking e¤ort xig and inter-group rent-seeking e¤ort yig.
The individuals simultaneously and independently decide how to allocate
their resources to these three activities.11 The budget constraints of the
individuals are
eig + xig + yig = 1:
Output is given by the production function
q = f
 
GX
g=1
mX
i=1
eig
!
where f (0) = 012 and f 0 (z) > 0 for all z  0: In addition, we assume that f is
log-concave. Although we focus the discussion below on the opportunity costs
of ghting, this production function also captures potential other negative
e¤ects, for example when ghting destroys output, as long as the amount
of destruction depends on the sum of ghting. To see this, consider the
11For some applications it is more appropriate to assume that the amount of external
conict is chosen collectively, by some political process, before the individuals engage in
production and internal conicts. We model this in section 4.
12Often ghting is not only over todays output, but also over (say) land, natural re-
sources, or valuable items produced in the past. We could capture this by assuming
f (0) > 0: In this case, there are additional corner solutions where there is only ghting,
but the main results below carry over.
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following production function
F
 
GX
g=1
mX
i=1
eig;
GX
g=1
mX
i=1
(xig + yig)
!
where F is increasing in its rst argument and decreasing in its second. Using
the budget constraints we can write
F
 
GX
g=1
mX
i=1
eig; n 
GX
g=1
mX
i=1
eig
!
= f
 
GX
g=1
mX
i=1
eig
!
:
The distribution of output depends on the rent-seeking activities. The
share that goes to group g is denoted by pg which is a function of all the
inter-group rent-seeking activities. Thus the amount that group g gets is
pgq. From that amount, individual i in group g gets the share rig which
depends on the intra-group rent-seeking activities of the members of group
g. The payo¤ of individual i in group g thus is
uig = rigpgq:
We assume a logistic technology of conict. Individual i in group g gets
the fraction
rig =
exp(axig)Pm
j=1 exp(axjg)
:
The parameter a > 0 describes the decisiveness of the intra-group contest.
If a is small, the rent-seeking e¤orts will have little inuence on the division
of output, whereas if a ! 1 then small di¤erences in rent-seeking e¤orts
are decisive. We think of a being determined by both technological factors
(for example police technology) and institutional factors pertaining to the
security of property within a group.
Similarly, group g gets the fraction
pg =
exp(b
Pm
j=1 yjg)PG
k=1 exp(b
Pm
j=1 yjk)
:
The parameter b > 0 describes the decisiveness of the inter-group contest.
Like a; this is determined by technological and institutional factors. However,
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b may di¤er from a since both the technology and the relevant institutions
di¤er in contests between groups from those in contests within groups. For
example, a higher importance of international institutions and methods of
peaceful international conict resolution would mean that there is a lower
incentive to engage in international ghting, which can be captured by a
lower b in our model. Similarly, the introduction of new means in inter-
group conicts (as the use of airplanes in the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001) can be understood as a higher decisiveness of inter-group conict.
The logistic contest success function is continuous, even when all con-
testants choose zero rent-seeking. This leads to a possibility of corner so-
lutions where some individuals choose zero rent-seeking e¤ort. Moreover,
adding a constant to all the rent-seeking e¤orts does not change the shares
of the contestants. The shares thus depend only on the di¤erence of the rent-
seeking e¤orts; the logistic contest success function is therefore also known
as the di¤erence form technology of conict.13
Since the game is completely symmetric, we will focus on symmetric equi-
libria. The game also has asymmetric equilibria, but these have similar prop-
erties.
3 What type of conict?
Use the budget constraint to eliminate eig from the objective function and
write
uig = rigpgf
 
GX
k=1
mX
j=1
(1  xjk   yjk)
!
: (1)
Individual i in group g solves the following maximization problem
max
xig ; yig
uig subject to
xig  0; yig  0; xig + yig  1:
With the logistic conict technology, an individuals share of total output
13This is the main property of the logistic contest success function that we will use
below; it corresponds to Axiom A7 in the axiomatization of contest success functions
by Skaperdas (1996). We could allow for more general di¤erence form contest success
functions, dropping Axioms A4 and A5 in Skaperdas (1996), without a¤ecting our main
results.
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is always strictly positive: rigpg > 0. Thus, each individual can guarantee
himself a strictly positive utility by choosing strictly positive productive ef-
fort; hence in any equilibrium, output is strictly positive. Therefore, in a
symmetric equilibrium, the constraint xig + yig  1 is not binding.
The objective function is concaviable (we show in appendix A1 that
lnuig is strictly concave in (xig; yig)). Moreover, the constraint set is con-
vex. Therefore, the following rst order conditions are both necessary and
su¢ cient for a maximum:
@uig
@xig
 0; xig  0; xig @uig
@xig
= 0; (2)
@uig
@yig
 0; yig  0; yig @uig
@yig
= 0: (3)
The rst inequality in (2) can be expressed as
a
Pm
j 6=i exp(axjg)Pm
j=1 exp(axjg)
 
 
GX
k=1
mX
j=1
(1  xjk   yjk)
!
;
where  (z) := f 0 (z) =f (z) : Note that, by our assumption that f is log-
concave; 0 (z) < 0 and an inverse function  1 exists. Focussing on a sym-
metric situation where xjk = x and yjk = y for all individuals j and groups
k, we get
a
m  1
m
  (n (1  x  y)) : (4)
Inequality (4) describes the trade-o¤ between production and intra-group
rent-seeking in a symmetric equilibrium. If it holds with strict inequality,
then x must be zero: the marginal benet of intra-group rent-seeking is
smaller than the opportunity cost of foregone production.
The rst inequality in (3) gives us
b
PG
k 6=g exp(b
Pm
j=1 yjk)PG
k=1 exp(b
Pm
j=1 yjk)
 
 
GX
k=1
mX
j=1
(1  xjk   yjk)
!
:
Imposing symmetry, we get
b
G  1
G
  (n (1  x  y)) : (5)
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Inequality (5) describes the trade-o¤ between production and inter-group
rent-seeking in a symmetric equilibrium. If it holds with strict inequality,
then y must be zero, because the marginal benet of inter-group rent-seeking
is smaller than the opportunity cost of foregone production.
There are four cases to consider. These are given in denition 1 below
and illustrated in gure 1.
Denition 1 Let case NO be dened by
 (n)  max

b
G  1
G
; a
m  1
m

; (NO)
case INTRA by
a
m  1
m
> max

b
G  1
G
;  (n)

; (INTRA)
case INTER by
b
G  1
G
> max

a
m  1
m
; (n)

; (INTER)
and nally case SPECIAL by
b
G  1
G
= a
m  1
m
>  (n) : (SPECIAL)
Which of these cases we are in, depends on the decisiveness of internal
and external conicts, on the number and size of the groups, and on the
production technology. We begin with case NO, where the opportunity cost
of rent-seeking in terms of forgone production are prohibitively high.
Lemma 1 In case NO, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium where all
e¤ort is put into production:
e = 1 and x = y = 0:
Proof. To see that this is an equilibrium, note that the rst order conditions
hold at (x; y) = (0; 0). To show uniqueness, suppose, to the contrary, that
(x0; y0) 6= (0; 0) is an equilibrium. Since  (n (1  x  y)) in increasing in x
and in y; it follows from condition (NO) that both (4) and (5) must hold
with strict inequality. This implies that x0 = y0 = 0, a contradiction.
11
ba
INTRA
NO
INTER
f(n) GG - 1
f(n) mm - 1
Figure 1: Here we illustrate the cases given in denition 1. The bold line
corresponds to case SPECIAL.
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Lemma 1 describes case NO where property is relatively secure and thus
the parameters a and b are relatively small. In this case, the individuals do
not engage in rent-seeking activities. However, if inequality (NO) does not
hold, there will be rent-seeking in equilibrium. Typically, there is conict
only within groups, or only between groups - but not both. For example,
if a is big relative to b; then there will be rent-seeking within the groups,
and no rent-seeking between groups; this is case INTRA dealt with in lemma
2 below. On the other hand, if b is big relative to a; then there is only
inter-group rent-seeking; this is case INTER dealt with in lemma 3.
Lemma 2 In case INTRA, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium where
there is no rent-seeking between groups (y = 0): Intra-group rent-seeking
x 2 (0; 1) is given by
a (m  1)
m
=  (n (1  x)) ; (6)
and productive e¤ort is e = 1  x:
Proof. First note that (6) denes a unique x: Second, x > 0 by (INTRA).
Third, x < 1 since limz!0  (z) = 1: Thus no constraints are violated.
Existence follows from the fact that the rst order conditions hold. For
uniqueness, we proceed in four steps.
1. As argued above, in any equilibrium e > 0 and hence x+ y < 1.
2. x = y = 0 is not an equilibrium, since then (4) is violated.
3. Suppose that y > 0 in equilibrium. This implies that (5) holds with
equality. Together with (INTRA), this contradicts (4).
4. It follows from steps 1 to 3 that in equilibrium we have 0 = y < x < 1.
Hence (4) holds with equality. This implies (6).
Lemma 3 In case INTER, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium where
there is no intra-group rent-seeking (x = 0): Inter-group rent-seeking y 2
(0; 1) is determined by
b
G  1
G
=  (n (1  y)) ; (7)
13
and productive e¤ort is e = 1  y:
Proof. Similar to the proof of lemma 2.
Finally, we have to consider case SPECIAL. Although this is a nongeneric
case (it corresponds to the bold line in gure 1), it will turn out to be
interesting from a normative point of view in section 5. In case SPECIAL, (4)
and (5) are no longer independent. This leads to a multiplicity of symmetric
equilibria.
Lemma 4 In case SPECIAL, there exists a continuum of symmetric equi-
libria where x+ y is determined by
a
m  1
m
 bG  1
G
=  (n (1  x  y)) ; (8)
and e = 1  x  y 2 (0; 1) :
Proof. The rst order conditions hold at all e; x and y satisfying (8).
Note that all the equilibria described in lemma 4 have the same amount
of production. The following proposition sums up the discussion and gives
some comparative statics.
Proposition 1 i) Only in the nongeneric case SPECIAL there is conict
both within and between groups. Typically, if there is conict at all, it takes
place either within groups, or between groups, but not both.
ii) Conict within groups is more likely if conicts within groups are very
decisive (a is large) and the number of groups G is small, holding the n
constant. When conict within groups occurs, then its intensity is increasing
in a and decreasing in G:
iii) Conict between groups is more likely if conicts between groups are very
decisive (b is large) and G is large, holding the n constant. When conict
between groups occurs, its intensity is increasing in b and in G:
Proof. Part i) is clear from lemmas 1-4. For part ii), note that (m  1) =m 
(n G) =n since n  mG: Thus, holding n constant, (m  1) =m decreases
in G: The result follows from 0 (z) < 0 and lemma 2. Similarly, part iii)
follows from lemma 3.
In the model we have an extreme form of the group cohesion e¤ect: there
is either conict within or between groups. In particular, a change in the
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technology of conict can change the situation from external conict with
internal peace to internal conict with external peace. This may contribute
to an explanation of several civil wars that occurred after the end of the cold
war. Diminished ideological di¤erences, and better possibilities for peaceful
cooperation in international organizations all meant that the benets from
engaging in external conict between the former two blocks were lowered. In
terms of the model, b went down. Accordingly, the equilibrium switched to
peace between the two former blocks, but then with internal conicts.
4 The diversionary use of force
As we argued in the introduction, decisions about external conict are often
taken by some political process which is di¤erent from the simultaneous and
independent optimization studied above in the basic version of our model.
Therefore, in this section we study what happens if the amount of external
conict is chosen collectively, by some political process, before the individuals
engage in production and internal conicts. To be more precise, we propose
the following two stage game:
1. Each group decides about the amount yg that each group member has
to put into the external conict.
2. After observing all the decisions taken in stage 1, individuals simul-
taneously and independently decide how to allocate their remaining
resources to production and internal ghting. That is, individual i in
group g chooses xig and eig such that xig + eig = 1  yg:
There are several ways to think of the political decision process in stage
1. In the model these all lead to the same result. One of the individuals in
a group might be a dictator who chooses yg in order to maximize his utility.
Or each group might delegate the decision right to one of its members, a
"politician" who has to decide about the amount of resources to put into
external conict. Finally, a group might just vote: due to the assumption of
identical individuals, the decision is unanimous.
We solve the game by backward induction. Section 4.1 studies the equi-
librium of the subgames in stage 2 for all possible choices taken in stage 1.
In section 4.2 we solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium.
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4.1 The second stage: internal ghting
In the second stage individuals choose the e¤ort they put into intra-group
rent-seeking and production. In their choices they are constrained by the
amount of resources that has already been devoted to the external conict
in the rst stage. Denote the objective function of individual i in group g on
the second stage by vig; and let x ig denote the vector of all the xjk except
xig: In stage 2, individual i in group g maximizes the following over xig
vig (xig; x ig; y1; :::; yG) = pg
exp (axig)Pm
j=1 exp (axjg)
f
 
GX
k=1
mX
j=1
(1  yk   xjk)
!
subject to
0  xig  1  yg:
This is a concaviable objective function with a convex constraint set. In a
solution, one of the following rst order conditions has to hold:
@vig
@xig
 0; xig = 0 or (9)
@vig
@xig
= 0; xig 2 (0; 1  yg) or (10)
@vig
@xig
 0; xig = 1  yg: (11)
Moreover, if one of these conditions holds, this is su¢ cient for a maximum.
These optimality conditions are similar to line (2) above, with the additional
constraint that xig cannot be bigger than 1   yg: Since groups may have
chosen di¤erent amounts of external ghting in the rst stage, we cannot
assume a symmetric solution where all the xigs are equal. This also means
that for some individuals the constraint that internal ghting cannot exceed
1  yg might be binding; line (11) takes this into account.
Calculating the derivative, we nd that
@vig
@xig
8<:
>
=
<
9=; 0, a
P
j 6=i exp (axjg)Pm
j=1 exp (axjg)
8<:
>
=
<
9=;
 
n m
GX
k=1
yk  
GX
k=1
mX
j=1
xjk
!
(12)
From line (12) and the rst order conditions (9)-(11), one can show the
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following lemma.
Lemma 5 Any equilibrium of the second stage is within-group symmetric:
all players i = 1; :::;m in a given group k choose the same xik = xk:
Proof. See appendix A2.
To see the logic behind this, consider the case where players 1 and 2 in a
group g choose to engage in both internal conict and production. Then the
rst order conditions imply that
@r1g
@x1g
r1g
= 
 
n m
GX
k=1
yk  
GX
k=1
mX
j=1
xjk
!
=
@r2g
@x2g
r2g
and this, in turn, implies that x1g = x2g: Of course, we have to check for
corner solutions as well; but here basically the same logic goes through.
Using within-group symmetry, line (12) simplies to
@vig
@xig
8<:
>
=
<
9=; 0, a (m  1)m
8<:
>
=
<
9=;
 
n m
GX
k=1
(yk + xk)
!
(13)
As one can imagine from our analysis in the last section, there are two cases
to consider. There is a threshold which depends on the choices in the rst
stage, such that if a is below the threshold, there is no internal ghting and
only production in stage 2. Lemma 6 below makes this precise. On the other
hand, if a is bigger than the threshold, then there is internal conict (see
lemma 7 below).
Lemma 6 If

 
n m
GX
k=1
yk
!
 a (m  1)
m
; (14)
then there exists a unique equilibrium of the subgames in stage 2 with xig = 0
for all individuals i and groups g: Payo¤s are
uig =
exp (bmyg)PG
k=1 exp (bmyk)
1
m
f
 
n m
GX
k=1
yk
!
: (15)
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Proof. See appendix A3.
To gain some intuition, observe that (14) is likely to hold if there has been
a lot of external ghting in stage 1. Hence there are few resources left over
in stage 2. Even if all the remaining resources are allocated to production,
the marginal incentives to produce are higher than the marginal incentives
to engage in internal conict. Thus, there is no internal ghting.
Lemma 7 If inequality (14) does not hold, then in any equilibrium of the
subgames in stage 2 there is internal ghting. The total amount of internal
ghting is determined by
a (m  1)
m
= 
 
n m
GX
k=1
(yk + xk)
!
: (16)
Payo¤s in all equilibria are
uig =
exp (bmyg)PG
k=1 exp (bmyk)
1
m
f

 1

a (m  1)
m

: (17)
Proof. See appendix A4.
Lemma 7 describes the case where there was relatively little ghting in
the rst stage. Here, if all the remaining resources were allocated to pro-
duction, the marginal incentives to ght internally would be higher than the
marginal incentives to produce. Thus, there is some internal ghting going
on, the amount being determined by the trade-o¤ between internal ghting
and production. Since expression (16) only determines the total amount of
internal ghting, the equilibrium will typically be not unique. All equilibria,
however, are payo¤ equivalent.
An interesting feature of the equilibrium utilities of the subgames in the
second stage is that, in the case with internal ghting (lemma 6), equilibrium
production does not depend on the choices made in the rst stage. If there
are more resources left over from the rst stage, this simply leads to more
internal conict in the second stage. Conversely, increasing yg gives groups g
a higher share pg of output, without decreasing production. Of course, this
is no longer true once there is so much external ghting in stage 1 that (14)
holds.
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4.2 The rst stage: external ghting
To analyze the equilibrium choices of the rst stage, we again have to consider
the cases distinguished in denition 1. In case NO, where both a and b are
relatively small, there will be no conict at all, and yg = 0 for all groups.
Moreover, in case INTER where b is relatively big, the equilibrium amount
of inter-group conict will be determined by a trade o¤ between inter-group
rent-seeking and production, exactly as in lemma 3 above. Given this amount
of inter-group ghting, there is no internal conict in stage 2.
The case INTRA where a is relatively big is di¤erent, however. In this
case, the equilibrium amount of inter-group conict is determined by the
condition that there is no internal conict in the second stage. That is,P
yk is determined such that (14) holds with equality. Again we focus on
symmetric equilibria where y1 = ::: = yG =: y. Proposition 2 sums up the
results.
Proposition 2 Suppose groups commit to the amount of external ghting
that each individual has to put into the inter-group conict, before individuals
decide on the allocation of their remaining resources to internal conict and
production. There is a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium, where the
equilibrium choices of external ghting are as follows.
In case NO, y1 = ::: = yG = 0.
In case INTRA, y is given by
a (m  1)
m
=  (n (1  y)) : (18)
In the cases INTER and SPECIAL, y is given by equation (7) in lemma 3.
In any case, there is no internal ghting on the equilibrium path.
Proof. See appendix A5.
The basic insight behind proposition 2 is as follows. In the rst stage,
the groups will spend enough on the external conict in order to ensure that
there is no internal ghting. This can be seen directly from equation (17):
as long as
P
yk is small enough such that we are in the case with internal
ghting described in lemma 6, utility of a group g is strictly increasing in yg.
Thus, on the equilibrium path there is no internal ghting. Rather, groups
use the external conict in order to get rid of their internal quarrels. In case
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INTRA, the groups choose their inter-group ghting such that there is no
internal conict. Quite literally, war with outsiders makes peace inside!
An interesting implication is that in case INTRA, how much external
ghting occurs depends on the technology of internal conict:
Corollary 1 In case INTRA, an increase in internal insecurity a leads to
more external ghting y; while changes in external insecurity b do not a¤ect
the amount of external ghting.
Proof. From (18).
Notice that in case INTRA, groups start ghting against each other even
if b is very small. In the extreme case where b = 0; external ghting has
no inuence on the share of a group and thus groups do not have an appro-
priation motive for external ghting. Nevertheless, even if b = 0 there is a
subgame perfect equilibrium where groups ght enough to prevent internal
conict. There are additional equilibria with internal ghting as well in this
case; they disappear as soon as b is strictly positive, however small. This is
thus a model of the "diversionary use of force".
5 In optimum both types of conict
This section turns to the normative implications of the model. In particular,
how many groups should an organization have, if it is ridden with potential
conict both within and between its groups? It turns out that the answer
to this question does not depend on whether groups can commit to their
external ghting before deciding on internal ghting and production. As the
following corollary shows, equilibrium utility is identical in both versions of
the model.
Corollary 2 In case NO equilibrium utility is uig = f (n) =n: In case INTRA
equilibrium utility equals
uig =
1
n
f

 1

a (m  1)
m

:
In the cases INTER and SPECIAL, equilibrium utility equals
uig =
1
n
f

 1

b (G  1)
G

:
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Proof. Case NO: follows directly from lemma 1 and proposition 2 (case
NO), respectively.
Case INTRA: from lemma 2 and proposition 2 (case INTRA), respec-
tively, it follows that total productive e¤ort is
GX
g=1
mX
i=1
eig = 
 1

a (m  1)
m

:
Inserting this in the utility function gives the result.
Case INTER: Similarly from lemmas 3 and 4, and proposition 2 (case
INTER).
As long as (INTRA) holds, productive e¤ort is increasing in the number of
groups holding constant the size n of the organization.14 Hence equilibrium
utility is increasing. But after some point, we switch to case INTER, and
here productive e¤ort and equilibrium utility are decreasing in the number
of groups. Thus, in order to minimize conict, the organization should be
designed such that we are in case SPECIAL, where there are simultaneous
inter- and intra-group conicts. In this sense, it is optimal to have both types
of conict. Proposition 3 makes this precise.
Proposition 3 For given n; an optimal number of groups is given by (ig-
noring integer problems)
G =
1
2a

(a  b)n+
q
n
 
4ab+ n (b  a)2 : (19)
Proof. If a (m  1) =m  a (n G) =n > b (G  1) =G; equilibrium utility is
weakly increasing in G by Corollary 2 and the fact that  1 is decreasing. On
the other hand, if a (n G) =n < b (G  1) =G; equilibrium utility is weakly
decreasing in G: Thus an optimal G solves
a
n G
n
= b
G  1
G
: (20)
14Recall that since n  mG; we have (m  1) =m  (n G) =G which is decreasing in
G: In addition,  is decreasing, thus  1 is decreasing as well.
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Equation (19) gives a root of (20). Note that G > 0 which is obvious if
a  b and follows, if a < b, from
(a  b)n+
q
n
 
4ab+ n (b  a)2 > (a  b)n+qnn (b  a)2
= n ((a  b) + jb  aj) = 0
A similar consideration shows that the second root of (20) is negative.
The optimal number of groups is not necessarily unique. The number
given in the proposition is always welfare maximizing. However, if the tech-
nology is very productive, di¤erent organizational structures can lead to zero
conict in equilibrium and thus be optimal. This should be kept in mind in
the discussion below.
The optimal number of groups has the following properties. First, typi-
cally the extreme cases G = 1 and G = n will not be optimal - this follows
directly from equation (20). Note that in the model the production technol-
ogy gives no reason for dividing individuals in di¤erent groups. The reason
for having several groups comes only from the rent-seeking activities. The
ndings are in sharp contrast to the case of a ratio type contest success func-
tion explored in Münster (2005) where the optimal number of groups is either
1 or n:
Second, if a = b; then G =
p
n: Since n  mG; this means that there
should be as many groups as there are individuals in any group.
Third, as one should expect, G is increasing in a and decreasing in b:
(This is also true in a bang-bang sense in the case with a ratio-type contest
success function.)
Fourth, G is increasing in n, when the total number of individuals is
increasing the optimal number of groups also increases.
Fifth, the gains due to having the right structure can be quite substan-
tial. In order to measure the gains, we compare the worst possible number
of groups with the best possible number of groups, and calculate the per-
centage increase in productive e¤ort. For simplicity, consider the case where
a = b and the production function has a constant elasticity form, f (z) = zh
where h > 0 is a returns to scale parameter. Here, with an optimal num-
ber of groups, productive e¤ort of an individual is h= (b (n pn)) : On the
other hand, the worst possible structure of the organization would be to have
only one group, or equivalently n groups. In this case, productive e¤ort is
h= (b (n  1)) : Changing from the worst situation to the optimal number of
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groups, we nd that the e¤ort increases by the factor 1 + 1=
p
n: The corre-
sponding increase in output depends on returns to scale, output increases by
the factor

1 + 1p
n
h
: The gains can be quite substantial; e.g. if n = 100;
productive e¤ort increases by 10%: The gains are decreasing in n: They are
maximal at n = 4 (for smaller n there is no way to make groups of equal
size), where productive e¤ort increases by 50%.
6 Conclusion
Many situations in economics and politics share the common structure that
individual players belong to groups, and there is a potential for conicts both
within and between the groups. Examples include wars and civil wars as well
as rent-seeking in multi-tiered organizations such as federal states, rms,
or universities. This paper studies the interdependence of internal conict,
external conict, and production. We set up an economic model of conict
and appropriation where players are partitioned in groups and can engage
into appropriation both against the other groups and within their own group.
We distinguish between a technology of external conict, which describes
how easy or di¢ cult it is to take from the other groups, and a technology
of internal conict, which describes the possibilities for appropriation within
groups. These technologies may di¤er because both the weapons used in the
two types of conicts as well as the institutions for conict resolution di¤er.
In the basic model individual players decide simultaneously and indepen-
dently about internal conict, external conict and production. We show
that with a logistic technology of conict, there is an extreme form of the
group cohesion e¤ectthat internal and external conict are negatively cor-
related. Generically, there is only internal conict, or only external conict -
but not both. Changes in the environment can switch the equilibrium from
one type of conict to the other. This may contribute to an explanation of
the upsurge of internal wars in the former Eastern Block after the end of the
cold war.
Decisions about external conict are often taken in some political process
rather than individually and independently. Thus we also study collective
decisions, where groups decide about the amount of resources that each group
member has to devote to the external conict before individuals choose how
to allocate their remaining resources to production and internal conict.
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Groups choose su¢ ciently high external conict in order to avoid internal
conict. Thus, there is no internal ghting on the equilibrium path. If prop-
erty gets more insecure within groups, and hence incentives to start ghting
internally are high, this leads only to more external ghting. That remains
true even if groups cannot gain much from the other groups by ghting
against them. Thus, we propose a model of diversionary wars, which is, in
contrast to the existing literature, not based on a principal agent problem.
The paper also has normative implications for the design of multi-tiered
organizations like federal states or big rms. Even when the technology of
production gives no reason for dividing individuals into groups, it is optimal
to do so in order to minimize unproductive conict. The optimal design of
a multi-tiered organization is one where individuals are indi¤erent between
putting resources in the internal or in the external conict. Thus, having
both types of conict is optimal.
There are three directions for further research that we think would be
particularly useful to explore. One is the targeting of external appropriation
activities against specic groups, or of internal ghting against single individ-
uals. A second topic is the endogenous formation and the stability of groups.
These extensions seem particularly interesting if players are asymmetric ex
ante. Finally, our model is static and thus one cannot study dynamics or
repeated interaction, whereas existing models of dynamic conict like Pol-
born (2005) and Bester and Konrad (2005) do not incorporate the distinction
between internal and external conict. Studying the interrelation between
the two types of conicts in a dynamic setting remains an important task.
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A Appendix
A.1 Log-concavity of the objective functions
From (1), we have
ln(uig) = b
mX
j=1
yjg   ln
 
GX
k=1
exp
 
b
mX
j=1
yjg
!!
| {z }
A(yig)
+
axig   ln
 
mX
j=1
exp (axjg)
!
| {z }
B(xig)
+
ln
 
f
 
GX
k=1
mX
j=1
(1  xjk   yjk)
!!
| {z }
C(xig ;yig)
To show that this is strictly concave in (xik; yik) look at the three terms in
turn.
First look at A(yig). Let V :=
PG
k 6=g exp

b
Pm
j=1 yjk

for notational
convenience. Then
A(yig) = byig + b
X
j 6=i
yjg   ln
 
V + exp
 
byig + b
X
j 6=i
yjg
!!
:
Di¤erentiating with respect to yig; we get
A0 (yig) = b  b
exp

byig + b
P
j 6=i yjg

V + exp

byig + b
P
j 6=i yjg
 :
This implies A00 (yig) < 0; hence A(yig) is strictly concave in yig. In addition,
note that A(yig) does not depend on xig:
Now look atB(xig). For notational convenience letW :=
Pm
j 6=i exp (axjg).
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Then
B(xig) = axig   ln (exp (axig) +W ) ;
B0(xig) = a  a exp (axig)
exp (axig) +W
:
This implies B00 (xig) < 0 and hence B(xig) is strictly concave in xig. In
addition, note that B(xig) does not depend on yig:
Finally, look at C(xig; yig). By assumption, ln f (z) is strictly concave in
z: This implies that
@2
@x2ig
C(xig; yig) =
@2
@y2ig
C(xig; yig) =
@
@xig
@
@yig
C(xig; yig) =
= 0
 
GX
k=1
mX
j=1
(1  xjk   yjk)
!
< 0:
The determinant of the Hessian Matrix is zero. Thus C(xig; yig) is weakly
concave in (xig; yig).
Finally, we can put things together to show that ln(uig) is strictly con-
cave in (xig; yig). Write ln(uig(x; y)) = A(x) + B(x) + C(x; y). For any
(x; y); (x0; y0) 2 R2+ and any t 2 (0; 1) we have
ln (uig(tx+ (1  t)x0; ty + (1  t)y0)) =
= A (ty + (1  t)y0) +B (tx+ (1  t)x0) + C (tx+ (1  t)x0; ty + (1  t)y0) <
< tA(y) + (1  t)A(y0) + tB(x) + (1  t)B(x0) + tC(x; y) + (1  t)C(x0; y0) =
= t ln (uig(x; y)) + (1  t) ln (uig(x0; y0)) :
Hence ln (uig(xig; yig)) is strictly concave in (xig; yig).
A.2 Proof of lemma 5
Suppose to the contrary that there are two individuals in the same group who
choose di¤erent amounts of internal rent seeking. Without loss of generality,
suppose
0  x1g < x2g  1  yg:
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Since x1g < 1   yg; from the rst order condition for player 1 (see lines (9)
and (10)), we have
a
P
j 6=1 exp (axjg)Pm
j=1 exp (axjg)
 
 
n m
GX
k=1
yk  
GX
k=1
mX
j=1
xjk
!
:
On the other hand, since 0 < x2g; from the rst order conditions for player
2 (lines (10) and (11)) we get

 
n m
GX
k=1
yk  
GX
k=1
mX
j=1
xjk
!
 a
P
j 6=2 exp (axjg)Pm
j=1 exp (axjg)
:
Putting things together, we haveX
j 6=1
exp (axjg) 
X
j 6=2
exp (axjg)
or x1g  x2g; a contradiction.
A.3 Proof of lemma 6
Existence: The condition of the lemma (i.e. inequality (14)) implies that the
rst order condition (9) for the case with no internal ghting holds for all
individuals. Uniqueness: Suppose there exists an equilibrium where xig > 0
for some individual i in a group g: Then, by condition (14) of the lemma, and
(13), we have @vig
@xig
< 0: This contradicts the rst order conditions (9)-(11).
Payo¤s follow by inserting.
A.4 Proof of lemma 7
Existence: By (13), if equation (16) holds, we have
@vig
@xig
= 0:
It remains to show that there exist x1; :::; xG such that 0  xg  1   yg for
g = 1; :::; G and such that equation (16) holds. Note that if xg = 1   yg for
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all g = 1; ::; G we have

 
n m
GX
k=1
(yk + xk)
!
=  (0) =1 > a (m  1)
m
: (21)
On the other hand, if xg = 0 for all g = 1; ::; G we have

 
n m
GX
k=1
(yk + xk)
!
= 
 
n m
GX
k=1
yk
!
<
a (m  1)
m
since in this case the condition of the lemma, inequality (14), does not hold.
By continuity of , there thus exist x1; :::; xG such that 0  xg  1   yg for
g = 1; :::; G and such that equation (16) holds. This completes the existence
proof.
Uniqueness: Because of lemma 5 we only have to consider within-group
symmetric equilibria. Equation (16) is equivalent to
m
GX
k=1
xk = n m
GX
k=1
yk    1

a
m  1
m

: (22)
To ease notation, let
X := n m
GX
k=1
yk    1

a
m  1
m

denote the right hand side of (22). Note that X > 0 since, by assumption,
(14) does not hold. Using the notation just introduced, (16) is equivalent to
m
PG
k=1 xk = X: Moreover, by (13), (16) is also equivalent to
@vig
@xig
= 0:
Suppose equation (16) does not hold. There are two possibilities. First,
if m
PG
k=1 xk < X we have
@vig
@xig
> 0 by (13). Then the rst order condition
implies xg = 1   yg for all groups, hence m
PG
k=1 xk = n  m
PG
k=1 yk > X;
contradicting the assumption m
PG
k=1 xk < X: Second, if m
PG
k=1 xk > X we
have @vig
@xig
< 0: Then the rst order condition implies xg = 0 for all groups,
and hence m
PG
k=1 xk = 0 < X; contradiction. Hence, there are no equilibria
where (16) does not hold.
Payo¤s follow from inserting.
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A.5 Proof of proposition 2
As argued in the main text, the fact that (17) is increasing in yg implies that
there is no internal ghting on the equilibrium path.
A.5.1 Case NO
Since  (n)  a (m  1) =m; inequality (14) holds for any possible y1; :::; yG:
Hence in the second stage we have xig = 0 for all i and g; no matter what
was chosen in stage 1. Therefore on stage 1 the groups solve
exp (bmyg)PG
k=1 exp (bmyk)
1
m
f
 
n m
GX
k=1
yk
!
! max
0yg1
:
Given  (n)  b (G  1) =G; the solution of this game is y1 = ::: = yG = 0:
A.5.2 Case INTRA
To begin with, note that equation (18) denes a unique y; namely
y = 1  1
n
 1

a (m  1)
m

2 (0; 1) (23)
by the same argument as in the proof of lemma 2.
Existence. If all groups choose yg = y given in (23), then in stage 2
xig = 0 for all i and g. Fix all y2 = ::: = yG = y and think of ui1 as a function
of y1: Choosing a y1 < y leads to internal conict in stage 2, and is thus
never optimal - in this range ui1 is strictly increasing in y1 (see line (17) in
lemma 7). On the other hand, if y1 2 [y; 1] there is no internal ghting. In
this range, the objective function ui1 is
ui1 =
exp (bmy1)
exp (bmy1) + (G  1) exp (bmy)
1
m
f (n  (G  1)my  my1) (24)
(see line (15)). We will show that ui1 is strictly decreasing in y1 for all y1 > y:
From (24),
@ui1
@y1
< 0 i¤ b
(G  1) exp (bmy)
exp (bmy1) + (G  1) exp (bmy) <  (n  (G  1)my  my1) :
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For all y1 > y;
b
(G  1) exp (bmy)
exp (bmy1) + (G  1) exp (bmy) < b
G  1
G
< a
m  1
m
<  (n  (G  1)my  my1)
where the second inequality is from (INTRA), and the third inequality is
from equation (18), y1 > y and 0 < 0: Hence for all y1 > y; ui1 is strictly
decreasing in y1, and group 1 has no incentive to increase y1 over y:
Uniqueness. Here we argue that there is no symmetric subgame perfect
equilibrium where y is not as given by (23).
Suppose
y < 1  1
n
 1

a (m  1)
m

:
Then we have internal ghting, contradiction. On the other hand, suppose
y > 1  1
n
 1

a (m  1)
m

:
Then we have  (n (1  y)) > am 1
m
> bG 1
G
. Hence each group would gain
from choosing a slightly lower yg - this still leads to zero internal conict
in the second stage, and the lower share of group g is outweighed by the
corresponding increase in output.
A.5.3 Case INTER
Existence. As in lemma 3, equation (7) denes a unique y 2 (0; 1). If
y1 = ::: = yG = y then we have xig = 0 for all i and g: Fix all yg = y;
g = 2; :::; G and think of ui1 as a function of y1: Choosing a y1 such that
there is internal ghting can never be optimal. On the other hand, among
the range where there is no internal ghting, uig is a concaviable objective
function to be maximized over a convex set, and at the proposed value the
derivative of the objective function is zero.
Uniqueness. Here we argue that there is no symmetric subgame perfect
30
equilibrium where y is not given by equation (7). Suppose that
y < 1  1
n
 1

b
G  1
G

:
Then each group would prot from increasing yg:
On the other hand, if
y > 1  1
n
 1

b
G  1
G

each group would prot from decreasing its yg:
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